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Pavlovian conditioned stimuli can influence instrumental responding, an effect called
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT). During the last decade, PIT has been subdivided into
two types: specific PIT and general PIT, each having its own neural substrates. Specific
PIT happens when a conditioned stimulus (CS) associated with a reward enhances an
instrumental response directed to the same reward. Under general PIT, instead, the CS
enhances a response directed to a different reward. While important progress has been
made into identifying the neural substrates, the function of specific and general PIT and
how they interact with instrumental responses are still not clear. In the experimental
paradigm that distinguishes specific and general PIT an effect of PIT inhibition has also
been observed and is waiting for an explanation. Here we propose an hypothesis that
links these three PIT effects (specific PIT, general PIT and PIT inhibition) to three aspects
of action evaluation. These three aspects, which we call “principles of action”, are: context,
efficacy, and utility. In goal-directed behavior, an agent has to evaluate if the context
is suitable to accomplish the goal, the efficacy of his action in getting the goal, and
the utility of the goal itself: we suggest that each of the three PIT effects is related
to one of these aspects of action evaluation. In particular, we link specific PIT with the
estimation of efficacy, general PIT with the evaluation of utility, and PIT inhibition with
the adequacy of context. We also provide a latent cause Bayesian computational model
that exemplifies this hypothesis. This hypothesis and the model provide a new framework
and new predictions to advance knowledge about PIT functioning and its role in animal
adaptation.
Keywords: Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, specific PIT, general PIT, goal-directed behavior, Bayesian network,
latent causes, nucleus accumbens
1. INTRODUCTION
Pavlovian conditioned stimuli (CS) associated to a reward can
affect instrumental responding toward the same or a different
reward. This effect is called Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT).
As an example, in a typical experimental scenario a rat is trained
to associate a sound (CS) with the delivery of food. Later, the rat
undergoes an instrumental training where it learns to press a lever
to get some food (without the sound being present). Finally, the
rat is presented again with the opportunity to press the lever, this
time both in the presence and absence of the sound. The results
show that the rat will press the lever more in the presence of the
sound than without, even if the sound has not been previously
paired with lever pressing. The Pavlovian sound-food associa-
tion learned in the first phase has somehow transferred to the
instrumental situation, hence the name “Pavlovian-instrumental
transfer.”
In recent years, this effect has been further subdivided into
specific and general PIT. Specific PIT happens when the CS is
paired with the same reward of the instrumental action. Instead,
general PIT happens when the CS is paired with a different
reward. In both cases, the presence of the CS leads to higher
instrumental responding, however, different neural substrates are
involved. Specific PIT involves the basolateral amygdala and the
nucleus accumbens shell. General PIT involves central amygdala
and the nucleus accumbens core (Corbit and Balleine, 2005, 2011).
While most of the Pavlovian-instrumental transfer experiments
have been done with rats, PIT is also present in humans and
seems to involve the same brain structures (Prévost et al., 2012).
Despite these advances in associating PIT effects to specific brain
areas, the specific neural mechanisms underlying them are still
unknown.
At the functional level, the picture is not fully clear either. Both
Pavlovian and instrumental learning are often thought about in
associationist terms. In associationist terms, Pavlovian condition-
ing leads to learning stimulus-outcome associations while instru-
mental conditioning can lead to associations between responses
and their outcomes. One straightforward way of explainining PIT
could be then in terms of a stimulus-outcome-response (S-O-R)
chain. According to this view, during Pavlovian learning the sub-
ject learns a stimulus-outcome association (S-O); while during
instrumental training it learns both a R-O (response-outcome)
association and its inverse O-R (outcome-response) association.
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In the PIT test phase, hearing the sound (S) triggers the activa-
tion of the food outcome representation (O) thanks to the S-O
association; this representation in turn activates its associated
response through the O-R association, thus increasing instru-
mental responding. In general PIT, however, the outcome in
the S-O association is not the same outcome of the O-R asso-
ciation. This case is thus explained by referring to the general
motivating properties of a rewarding outcome instead of its spe-
cific sensory properties, so that the CS presence can still enhance
instrumental responding, even if the CS is associated to a differ-
ent reward. However, the S-O-R chain and the general motivation
explanations leave some issues unresolved. For example, they do
not explain why there is no general PIT effect when the con-
ditioned stimulus (CS) is associated with a reward given by a
different instrumental response than the one currently available
(see paradigm in section 2). In this case, one would expect that, as
the CS-evoked reward is different compared to the one currently
available through instrumental action, a non-specific (general)
PIT effect should happen. The absence of any enhancing PIT
effect in this particular condition is currently attributed to a non-
well defined inhibitory effect (Corbit and Balleine, 2005, 2011).
Moreover, the S-O-R chain and general motivation explanations
indicate what “computation” the agent is doing but they do not
say why the agent is doing it.
Our proposal is that, in goal-directed behavior, each of the three
PIT processes (specific PIT, general PIT and PIT inhibition) plays
a role in the evaluation of different aspects of the action (principles
of action). In particular, we posit that an agent that wishes to act to
accomplish a goal needs to take into account at least three aspects:
context, efficacy and utility. The principle of context means that
an action needs the right context to reach its goal—e.g., it is use-
less to call for a waiter if you are not at a restaurant. Efficacy is
the probability of reaching a goal: not all actions are guaranteed
to accomplish a goal. For example, buying a single lottery ticket
has few chances of success. Utility means that the result of the
action can be more or less valuable, depending on the state of the
agent. For example, pressing a lever for food has a high value if
the animal is hungry, less or no value if it is sated. According to
our hypothesis, an animal considers all these three aspects when
it chooses which action to perform. The three PIT effects (specific
PIT, general PIT and PIT inhibition) are each related to one of
these aspects. We will link specific PIT with efficacy (chances of
success), general PIT with utility (value of the future state) and
PIT inhibition with context (availability of certain rewards).
We will also propose a Bayesian computational model that
exemplifies our hypothesis. The model will build upon previ-
ous work in the Pavlovian literature that conceptualizes Pavlovian
conditioning as latent-causes learning. The interplay of latent-
causes (which can also be thought as contexts) will affect the
number of available rewards and their probability, capturing the
three PIT processes as in our hypothesis.
Our hypothesis and the model together provide a new frame-
work and new predictions to advance knowledge about PIT. Our
proposal is strongly tied to goal-directed behavior. Indeed we
think that it is important to study PIT because if offers a pecu-
liar window of observation on both Pavlovian and instrumental
processes. Hopefully future work on this line of research will
improve not only our understanding of PIT but of Pavlovian and
instrumental processes as well.
In the following sections, we will first review the current
experimental paradigm used to distinguish specific and general
PIT (section 2). We will then discuss some issues with current
explanations of PIT (section 3). After that, we will explain our
hypothesis (section 4) and provide a computational model for it
(section 5). In the final section we will discuss new predictions
and limitations of the hypothesis and draw some final conclusions
(section 6).
2. PIT PARADIGM
As noted in the introduction, PIT is not a unitary process. The
experimental paradigm to distinguish specific PIT and general
PIT was introduced by Corbit and Balleine (2005) (see Figure 1).
It involves three phases: a Pavlovian phase, an instrumental phase
and a test phase. In the Pavlovian phase, three sounds are asso-
ciated with delivery of three different foods. In the instrumental
phase, the rat undergoes two separate trainings: in each of these
two trainings it learns to press a lever for a different food. The
rewards used for the instrumental phase are two of the foods
previously used in the Pavlovian training. A non-continuous rein-
forcement schedule is used, so the relationship between pressing
the lever and obtaining food is probabilistic. For example, if a
random-ratio RR20 schedule is used, the rat will get the reward
about once every 20 lever presses. In the final phase PIT is tested.
The rat is presented with one of the levers and each of the three
sounds are played separated by some interval. This phase is done
in extinction (no delivery of food) to prevent further reinforce-
ment learning that could confound the results. When there is
no sound, the rat will press the lever with a certain frequency
(baseline). During two of the three sounds it will press the lever
more than the baseline (PIT effect). Specifically, it will press more
when it hears either the sound associated with the same reward
of the lever (specific PIT) or the sound associated with a reward
not used in the instrumental phase (general PIT). However, the
sound associated with the reward of the other lever will not aug-
ment instrumental responding to the tested lever. Something is
preventing PIT to be expressed in this latter case: we will call this
effect PIT inhibition (we will return on this point in section 3).
By using this paradigm, Balleine and collegues have been able
to identify the different neural substrates underlying specific and
general PIT. Lesions to nucleus accumbens shell or basolateral
amygdala eliminate specific PIT, while lesions to nucleus accum-
bens core or central amygdala eliminate general PIT (Corbit and
Balleine, 2005, 2011). These substrates have also been confirmed
by using inactivation and disconnection procedures (Shiflett and
Balleine, 2010; Corbit and Balleine, 2011). Moreover, by using
this paradigm a further important difference between specific and
general PIT has been found: general PIT is subject to devalua-
tion, while specific PIT is not. To show this, Corbit et al. (2007)
executed the test phase of the paradigm after sating rats and
they found that specific PIT was still present while general PIT
disappeared (Figure 2). That is, general PIT is affected by the
devaluation of food by satiation, while specific PIT is not. There
have been previous reports about PIT being unaffected by deval-
uation but a different paradigm was used and no lesions were
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FIGURE 1 | Left: PIT paradigm to distinguish specific and general PIT. Right: histogram showing typical results of the test phase, in terms of lever press
frequency. ∗Responding is significantly higher in Condition A and C. Histogram adapted with permission of Society for Neuroscience (Corbit and Balleine, 2011).
performed, so the type of PIT evoked (specific or general) in those
experiments can only be inferred (Rescorla, 1994; Holland, 2004).
In Holland (2004) some of the reported results can be interpreted
as specific and general PIT being both unaffected by devaluation,
in contrast with results from Corbit et al. (2007). We will discuss
this contradiction in the final section.
3. EXPLAINING PIT: CURRENT ISSUES
As mentioned in the introduction, specific PIT can be thought
in terms of a S-O-R chain: the sound stimulus evokes an out-
come (food) and that food in turn evokes the associated response
(pressing the lever). In the case of general PIT, instead, the sound
evokes food and the reward of food exerts a general motivational
effect on instrumental responses. As an example of this kind of
explanations, we will look at the associative-cybernetic model of
Balleine & Dickinson as reported by Ostlund and Balleine (2007).
This is, to our knowledge, the most complete model in the PIT
literature. The associative-cybernetic model is actually not just a
model of PIT, but a more general model of both Pavlovian and
instrumental processes. However it does include a way to explain
both specific and general PIT functioning.
In the model, Pavlovian stimulus-outcome associations are
represented in the “associative memory” component (see
Figure 3). According to Balleine and Ostlund (2007), during
instrumental learning, both R-O and O-R association are learned.
Indeed, food is not only the result of pressing the lever, but it
also precedes the next lever pressing. So within the “S-R mem-
ory” component, food is considered as a stimulus (SO) that
precedes the response and thus SO − R associations are learned.
When the Pavlovian sound stimulus is encountered, it activates
its representation in the associative memory (e.g., S1). In turn, its
representation activates its associatiated food outcome as a stim-
ulus in S-R memory (SO1). This representation then activates the
corresponding instrumental response (R1). This “pathway” in the
model can thus explain how specific PIT works and it is basically
a S-O-R chain explanation.
However, there is a second pathway in the model through
which Pavlovian stimuli can influence instrumental responses.
Assume that the rat now hears a different sound S2 associated
with a different food outcome O2. The specific PIT pathway
will not work because this food is not associated to R1 in the
S-R memory. However, the sound S2 activates O2 in the asso-
ciative memory. This activates the corresponding O2 in the
“reward memory” component, which in turn activates the reward
node (Rew). We can think the Rew node as an “expectation of
value”. This expectation of value (Rew) can exert an excitatory
effect on all motor responses (arrows from Rew to all responses
R1..Rn). Thus the sound stimulus can evoke an expectation of
value through which it can aspecifically enhance an instrumen-
tal response associated with a different food. This effect can be
assumed to be a model of general PIT. The fact that general PIT
works through an expectation of value is also consistent with
the fact that general PIT (and not specific PIT) is sensitive to
devaluation.
Even though the associative-cybernetic model can explain the
existence of both specific and general PIT and their interaction
with devaluation, some important aspects in PIT experimental
data remain without answer and suggest that PIT phenom-
ena need a more complex explanation. A first important aspect
involves the absence of general PIT in the same condition. In the
same condition, a CS associated with a certain food enhances
an instrumental response directed to the same food. One might
expect that, according to the associative-cybernetic model, the
CS would also elicit general PIT, using both pathways at the
same time. That is, the CS could elicit PIT both through the S1-
SO1-R1 pathway and through the S1-O1-O1-Rew-R1 pathway
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FIGURE 2 | Mean lever presses during PIT test phase, in hungry rats
and in sated ones. Shifting the motivational state from hunger to satiety
(food devaluation) causes a general drop in instrumental performance and
the disappearance of general PIT. (A) rats tested in hunger state: ∗both
same (specific PIT) and general (general PIT) conditions are higher than
baseline (B) rats tested in sated state: ∗only same (specific PIT) condition is
higher than baseline. Reprinted with permission © The Authors (2007).
Journal Compilation © Federation of European Neuroscience Societies and
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., (Corbit et al., 2007). ∗p < 0.05.
(Figure 3). In other words, one might expect that the CS can
have both a specific PIT effect, as it evokes the food associated
with the instrumental response, and a general PIT effect as it
evokes an expectation of value (food) that can motivate instru-
mental responses aspecifically. Experimental data shows that this
is not the case. Figure 4 shows that BLA lesions, belonging to spe-
cific PIT circuit, eliminate all PIT effect in the same condition.
Morever, lesion of central amygdala, which belongs to the general
PIT circuit, does not have any effect in the same condition. This
means that in this condition only specific PIT is expressed and
there is no general PIT.
There is another case where the explanation of the associative-
cybernetic model is incomplete. In the data shown in Figure 4
we can notice that in the different condition there is no PIT
effect (neither specific nor general). The different condition cor-
responds to the case where the CS is associated with the reward
of the other, not-available, instrumental response—that is, the
reward of the lever not used during that test. One would expect
that, as the CS is not associated to the same reward of the avail-
able instrumental response, it cannot elicit specific PIT but it
would still elicit general PIT. On the contrary, there is no visibile
PIT effect: the instrumental response stays at baseline level, even
after lesions to the specific or general PIT circuit (see Figure 4).
The associative-cybernetic model does not offer an explanation
for this. There is no connection in the model that can explain
why the aspecific effect of the “general PIT pathway” should be
inhibited toward some instrumental responses. Even those arti-
cles that contain experimental data about this absence of general
PIT simply suggest that there must be some kind of inhibitory
effect (Corbit and Balleine, 2005), or they suggest possible neu-
ral locations of this inhibitory effect (Corbit and Balleine, 2011),
but without exactly explaining its presence. So there is an inibitory
effect, capable of suppressing general PIT, waiting to be explained.
This effect is not always of the same entity: in some cases it is
possible to have some kind of “partial” PIT effect in the different
condition, as shown in Figure 5. This means that the inhibitory
effect has not been able to completely suppress general PIT. We
will return on this in the final section, suggesting one possible
way on how it might happen.
Finally, there is a third kind of data that asks for a different
explanation than the two simple pathways. At the beginning of
this century, a contradiction in the PIT literature arose. Blundell
et al. (2001) reported that lesions to the basolateral amygdala
affected PIT, while Hall et al. (2001) reported that lesions on
central amygdala, and not basolateral amygdala, abolished PIT
(see Figure 6). This contradiction was then resolved in Corbit
and Balleine (2005) by showing that there exist two kinds of
PIT, one depending on basolateral amygdala (specific PIT) and
one depending on central amygdala (general PIT). However, one
question remained open: why did Hall et al. (2001) procedure
elicit general PIT (as shown by the sensitivity to central amygdala)
instead of specific PIT as Blundell et al. (2001)? Hall et al. (2001)
used a single CS and a single instrumental response, both associ-
ated to the same reward. Blundell et al. (2001), instead, used two
CS and two levers with two different rewards. In both cases an
interval reinforcement schedule was used. Given that Hall et al.
(2001) used the same food for both the CS and the lever, one
would expect a specific PIT, not a general PIT. Later articles usu-
ally refer to that fact simply by saying that procedures with a single
lever seem to elicit general PIT instead of specific PIT (Corbit
and Balleine, 2005, 2011). Our view is that it could be not just
a question of the number of levers, but of the kind of instrumen-
tal response elicited: habitual versus goal-directed. It is known that
interval schedules with a single lever easily lead to habitual behav-
ior, while single-lever random ratio schedules and two-levers
procedures (even using interval schedules) usually elicit goal-
directed behavior (Yin and Knowlton, 2006). We suggest that the
real reason underlying the lack of specific PIT effect in Hall et al.
(2001) is that the elicited behavior was habitual. Our hypothesis,
illustrated in the next section, will link specific PIT with the prob-
ability of reaching the goal of an action. Since in habitual behavior
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the action is a simple “reaction” to a stimulus and there is no
goal evaluation, specific PIT cannot happen; general PIT, instead,
not being tied to the specific consequences of the action, might
still happen. Thus, Hall et al. (2001), by eliciting habitual behav-
ior, measured general PIT instead of specific PIT and found it to
be sensitive to central amygdala lesions, whereas Blundell et al.
(2001) observed specific PIT in goal-directed behavior and found
it to be affected by basolateral amygdala lesions.
4. THREE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION: CONTEXT, EFFICACY,
UTILITY
Experimental data from the PIT test phase shows three different
conditions with three different effects: specific PIT, general PIT
and PIT inhibition.We will now explain our hypothesis according
to which these three effects are functionally linked to three aspects
of action evaluation during goal-directed behavior.
An instrumental action, such as lever pressing connected to
food, can be either habitual or goal-directed (Yin and Knowlton,
2006). In the case of habitual behavior, the instrumental action is
elicited by a simple stimulus-response association and there is no
evaluation of the consequences. In the case of goal-directed behav-
ior, instead, the response is directed to a goal and it is linked to the
evaluation of its consequences. These two types of behavior can
be distinguished by devaluation and contingency alteration pro-
cedures. In the devaluation procedure food is devalued (e.g., by
satiety) while in the contigency alteration procedures the relation-
ship between pressing the lever and the presence of food is altered
(e.g., pressing the lever now stops food delivery). In the case of
habitual behavior, the rat (or other subject) will keep pressing
the lever, while in the case of goal-directed behavior it will stop
pressing it when the ability of the action to obtain food or the
value of available food are altered. That is, goal-directed behavior
distinguishes itself because action consequences are evaluted,
both in terms of probability of happening and value.
FIGURE 4 | PIT effects after lesions of basolateral amygdala (BLA) and
central nucleus of amygdala (CN), compared to a sham lesion group.
The histogram shows PIT effects as frequency of lever pressing in the
presence of CS minus lever frequency in the absence of CS (baseline). The
control group (sham) shows specific PIT effect in the same condition (CS
associated with the same reward as the instrumental response) and general
PIT effect in the general condition (CS associated with a reward not used in
the instrumental phase). Notice the absence of any PIT effect in the different
condition where the CS is associated to the reward of the lever not available
during the test. BLA and CN lesions eliminate specific PIT and general PIT,
respectively. Reprinted with permission of Society for Neuroscience (Corbit
and Balleine, 2005).
FIGURE 3 | Associative-cybernetic model by Balleine and Dickinson as reported by Balleine and Ostlund (2007). Reprinted with permission © 2007 New
York Academy of Sciences.
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FIGURE 5 | PIT test phase in Corbit and Janak (2010). The control group
in the figure displayed a noticeable PIT effect even in the different
condition, albeit significantly less stronger than the one in the same
condition (∗∗). Experimental groups with dorsal striatum lesions (not shown
here) also showed similar PIT effects in the different condition. Adapted
with permission © The Authors (2010). Journal Compilation © Federation of
European Neuroscience Societies and Blackwell Publishing Ltd., (Corbit and
Janak, 2010). ∗∗p < 0.01.
FIGURE 6 | Mean lever press during PIT test phase. During training a
single CS and a single lever were used, associated to the same food
reward. The CS enhances instrumental response compared to baseline (ITI)
only in the group with basolateral amygdala (BLA) lesion and in the control
groups (Sham). Even though the same reward has been used for both the
CS and the instrumental response, it is the central amygdala (CeN) lesion
(general PIT circuit) to prevent PIT effect and not the one to the basolateral
amygdala (specific PIT circuit). (A) comparison of BLA lesion group vs.
Sham lesion group: both groups show a PIT effect during the CS period (B)
comparison of CeN group vs. Sham lesion group: the CeN group
instrumental response is not enhanced by the CS. Reprinted with
permission © Federation of European Neuroscience Societies (Hall et al.,
2001).
Our hypothesis is that, during goal-directed behavior, the three
aspects of PIT (specific PIT, general PIT, PIT inhibition) are
linked to three aspects of this evaluation.
• Context. A goal-directed action must be executed in the right
context (it is useless to call for a waiter if you are not at the
restaurant).
• Efficacy. A goal-directed action can be more or less effective in
reaching its goal (buying a single lottery ticket has few chances
of winning).
• Utility. The goal of an action can bemore or less useful (getting
food is useful if you are hungry, less or not useful if you are
sated).
General PIT can be linked to the principle of utility: a CS associ-
ated with food evokes a reward in the near future. Our hypothesis
is that this reward is added to the future scenario of the conse-
quences of the action, thus enhancing the motivation to execute
it. However, if the animal is sated, this added reward clearly has
no longer any value, so the motivation effect vanishes. As we saw
before, satiety does indeed eliminate general PIT (Corbit et al.,
2007). Moreover, the motivational effect of general PIT is possi-
ble only if the reward evoked by the CS is an “additional reward”
compared to the one already foreseen by the action. In agreement
with this, data collected using random-ratio schedules (where the
behavior is usually goal-directed) show that in the specific PIT
condition (where the CS reward is the same as the lever) general
PIT does not happen (Corbit and Balleine, 2005, 2011).
Specific PIT can be linked instead to the principle of efficacy.
A CS associated to the same reward as the lever predicts that
this reward will be present in the near future. During the action
evaluation, the CS acts as a cue that there is an higher chance
of getting the reward associated to the action, thus motivating
the agent to pursue that action. As specific PIT is then about an
increase of probability of getting the food, this effect is immune to
devaluation: whether the animal is sated or not, the CS predicts
an higher probabily of reward, so, compared to the CS absence,
the action will be evalued more positively. In agreement with
this link between specific PIT and probability, in a human study,
Trick et al. (2011) found that more predictive conditioned stimuli
(those with higher probability of reward) induce a stronger PIT
effect.
Lastly, PIT inhibition can be linked to the principle of context.
We suggest that the presence of the lever acts as a discriminatory
stimulus that inhibits the reward of the absent lever. That is, the
presence of the lever signals not only that its associated reward is
available, but also that it is not possible to obtain the reward of the
other lever. The general PIT effect would be then inhibited by the
presence of the lever associated with a different reward compared
to the CS.
In other words, specific PIT represents the ability of an agent to
take into account cues that indicate that a certain reward is more
probable in the environment compared to when those cues are
absent. The fact that those rewards are more probable translates
into a perceived higher efficacy of the action. General PIT repre-
sents instead the ability to use cues that indicate the presence of
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other “additional” rewards in the environment, thus motivating
the agent to act as they constitute an added value (utility). Finally,
PIT inhibition represents the ability to take into account the con-
text and to inhibit rewards signals that are known to be not
available through action at that time (context). In the following
section, we will now try to exemplify our hypothesis through a
computational model.
5. A BAYESIAN MODEL OF PIT
Bayesian modeling is increasingly used in many fields, from
chemistry (Hibbert and Armstrong, 2009) to astrophysics
(Loredo, 1992), from economy (Poirier, 2006) to genetics
(Beaumont and Rannala, 2004). This increasingly widespread
use has even prompted some to call it a “Bayesian revolu-
tion” (Beaumont and Rannala, 2004). Bayesian approaches are
now being used in cognitive science too: indeed, both Pavlovian
(Courville et al., 2004, 2005, 2006; Gershman and Niv, 2012) and
instrumental (Solway and Botvinick, 2012; Pezzulo et al., 2013)
Bayesian network models have been created.
The Bayesian approach owes its name to the Bayes theorem:
p(h|d) = p (d|h) p(h)
p(d)
(1)
The theorem says that the posterior probability of an event h given
a set of observations d, denoted with p(h|d), is equal to the prob-
ability of observing d given the event h, denoted with p(d|h),
multiplied by the a priori probability of h, divided by the a priori
probability of observing d. In other words, the theorem trans-
forms the a priori probability of h in a posterior probability of
h that takes into account the set of observations d. Bayes theorem
tells us how to “update” in an optimal way our belief about h hap-
pening given the data d at our disposal. This theorem can then be
used to create models about how an animal canmake sound infer-
ences about the events of the world given what it sees. Indeed,
we have chosen to use this approach to simulate Pavlovian and
instrumental learning and so to build a Bayesian computational
model of PIT.
In the Pavlovian literature, Pavlovian learning is often thought
as S-O learning, that is, as the acquisition of the association
between a stimulus (S) and an outcome (O). In particular, associ-
ationist models usually focus on the predictive properties of S.
Models such as Rescorla-Wagner (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972)
or Pearce (Pearce, 1994) try to explain how S comes to predict
outcome O (and thus elicit a Pavlovian response). However, a
different approach exists. For example, Courville et al. (2005)
describes Pavlovian learning using a Bayesian generative model
with hidden latent causes. In this model, the animal does not sim-
ply try to learn how often O occurs after S. Instead, the animal
tries to learn the whole generative model: that is, it tries to learn
the hidden cause that makes both S and O appear. Indeed, this is
also amore rational strategy by the animal, as in Pavlovian experi-
ments S does not really cause O, but the two simply occur together
because of a common cause (the experimental setup). By using
this model, Courville et al. explain phenomena that are otherwise
not well accounted for by classical associationist models such as
Rescorla-Wagner or Pearce ones (Courville et al., 2005).
FIGURE 7 | Bayesian network used to simulate PIT. There are three set
of nodes: observable objects such as levers (L1, L2), sounds (S1, S2, S3)
and foods (F1, F2, F3); latent causes that influence the presence of objects
in the world (H1, H2, H3, H4, H5); the action of pressing the lever (A). Lever
pressing is linked only to foods F1 and F2 as it can influence only their
presence and not the other observables.
Inspired by this work, we “extended” it to the instrumental
realm to explain PIT. As in Courville et al. (2005), our model is
a sigmoid belief network (see Figure 7). The network is formed by
three set of nodes:
• Observables: nodes that represent objects such as levers (L1,
L2, L3), sounds (S1, S2, S3), foods (F1, F2, F3).
• Latent causes: nodes that represent hypothetic causes (H1, H2,
H3, H4, H5) that can explain the observation or the lack of
observation of the objects in the world.
• Actions: a single node that represents the action of pressing a
lever (A) which can influence the presence of some objects in
the world.
The activations of each node in the network represent the prob-
ability that the corresponding object is present. The nodes influ-
ence each other through their links. Each link is associated to a
numericalweight. Those weights can be either positive or negative
(or zero). Positive weights from a node to anothermean that when
the parent node is active, the child node is more likely to happen.
Negative weights, instead, decrease the probability of the child
node to be active. For simplicity, in this model only link weights
are learned, while the number of hidden causes and their links are
given. Learning link weights means that the agent has to discover
how the hidden causes affect the probabilties of each observable
and how its action can influence the presence of food. At first, we
assigned a distribution of a priori probabilities to each link cen-
tered on the value of zero. This means that, before learning, the
agent has not yet formed a particular “belief” on how these latent
causes (or its action) can affect what he sees in the world. Then
we trained the model by applying Bayesian inference on a set of
simulated observations that represent Pavlovian and instrumen-
tal learning (following the paradigm described in section 2). As
in Courville et al. (2005), we used a Monte Carlo Markov Chain
method for training the model, in our case using WinBUGS soft-
ware (Lunn et al., 2000). The resulting a posteriori distribution
of probabilities describes the animal belief on how the world
works after the conditioning sessions. The resulting model with
weights based on the Pavlovian and instrumental training can
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account for the various PIT effects. We will now describe how
the model behaves in each phase of the PIT paradigm and how
it accounts for the three PIT effects: specific PIT, general PIT and
PIT inhibition.
5.1. PAVLOVIAN PHASE
During Pavlovian training, the rat sees that sound S1 and food F1
are correlated, so it assumes that an hidden cause H1 is generating
both events. This happens for all the three Pavlovian trainings,
thus generating positive weights between each of the three hidden
causes (H1, H2, H3) and its pair of sound and food events (see
Figure 8).
FIGURE 8 | Pavlovian phase: positive links between latent variables
and co-occurring sounds and foods are established.
FIGURE 9 | Instrumental phase: instrumental latent causes, which give
rise to the presence of the levers, interact with action to make food
available. Instrumental latent causes also inhibit each other’s food
availability (negative links depicted as dashed lines).
5.2. INSTRUMENTAL PHASE
During instrumental learning, the rat sees that the presence
of a lever L1 and food F1 availability are correlated, so it
assigns a positive weight to the links between H4 and L1 and
between H4 and F1 (see Figure 9). Food delivery, however,
depends also on the action of lever pressing (A), so a posi-
tive link between action and food is also formed. The same
happens for the other instrumental learning with lever L2 and
food F2. The rat also learns a negative association (dashed line)
between the “instrumental” hidden cause and the other food:
in other words, with experience it discovers that when H4 is
active and lever L1 is present, lever pressing (A) will not obtain
food F2.
5.3. TEST PHASE
The test phase involves four possible conditions depending on
the presence of different sounds togheter with one of the levers.
This will give rise to different patterns of activations in the trained
model (see Figure 10):
Baseline: in the baseline condition, lever L1 is presented alone.
The rat will press it with some frequency knowing, from previous
instrumental learning, that when L1 is present it can get food F1
by lever pressing (action A).
Condition A – specific PIT: from the presence of S1 and L1,
the rat can infer the presence of causes H1 and H4, which both
predict F1 in the near future. This motivates the rat to press the
lever more than when L1 is present alone, without any sound, as
there are now increased chances of getting F1 in the immediate
future.
ConditionC – general PIT: the presence of lever L1 and sound
S3 implies that causes H4 and H3might be present and that foods
F1 and F3 will appear in the future. While food F3 is not a direct
effect of lever pressing A, its predicted presence nevertheless moti-
vates the rat to press the lever more than the baseline condition.
This is a different kind of motivation from Condition A: instead
of augmenting the probablity of the food targeted by the action,
it adds a new food reward to the scene.
Condition B – PIT inhibition: this condition is similar to con-
dition C, but in this case food F2, evoked by sound S2 (through
H2), is inhibited by cause H4. Thus, only food F1 remains
predicted and no enhancement is found compared to the baseline.
FIGURE 10 | PIT test phase. Hearing different sounds gives rise to
different interactions in the model. For clarity, only relevant nodes
from the previous learning phases are shown in each condition.
The model can match typical experimental results, such as the
histogram from Corbit and Balleine (2011). Histogram adapted with
permission of Society for Neuroscience.
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The model thus exemplifies how our hypothesis could work.
Specific PIT arises from the interaction between Pavlovian and
instrumental latent causes that results in the evaluation of higher
chances of getting the reward connected to the action (principle of
efficacy). General PIT arises from adding value (a new reward) to
the predicted future scenario (principle of utility). The absence of
general PIT in the third condition could be instead consequence
of the fact that the reward predicted by the CS is excluded as it
is not possible in the presence of the particular lever (principle of
context).
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we have first reviewed some experimental data
about Pavlovian-instrumental transfer. These data suggest that
PIT cannot be simply explained in terms of a S-O-R chain
plus an aspecific excitatory process. At the very least, a third
inhibitory process is present in the experimental data, waiting
to be explained. We have suggested an hypothesis that can both
explain how these three processes work and what is their func-
tion. We have linked specific PIT, general PIT and PIT inhibition
to three principles of goal-directed action. The idea is that these
three PIT processes represent the effect of conditioned Pavlovian
stimuli on three aspects of the action evaluation that happens in
goal-directed behavior. These three aspects are: context (an action
directed to a goal needs the right context), efficacy (an action can
have more or less chances to accomplish a certain goal) and util-
ity (the consequences of an action can be more or less useful).
According to this, specific PIT represents the use of cues that indi-
cate higher chances of getting a certain reward. Data supporting
the relationship between specific PIT and reward probabililities
can be found in Trick et al. (2011) where those CS associated with
higher chances of reward elicited stronger PIT. Explaining specific
PIT in terms of probability would also agree with the fact that spe-
cific PIT is not influenced by devaluation procedures (Rescorla,
1994; Holland, 2004; Corbit et al., 2007): indeed the probability of
getting a reward is independent of its value. Instead, general PIT
affects utility of the action, its value, so it is subject to devaluation
(Corbit et al., 2007). General PIT corresponds to the use by the
agent of cues that indicate the presence of an additional reward
in the immediate future and this motivates the animal to execute
its actions with more vigor. Lastly, the inhibition of general PIT
in some situations corresponds to the use of cues to understand
which rewards are available in a given context.
We have then created a model of how this functional hypoth-
esis could be translated into probabilistic computation. In partic-
ular, we have created a model drawing inspiration from Courville
et al. (2005) where Pavlovian conditioning is explained in terms
of a latent-cause generative model. By adding an action node
and its links to food we have simulated instrumental learning,
thus explaining the three PIT effects in terms of interactions
between latent causes representing the contexts learned during
Pavlovian conditioning and those learned through instrumental
conditioning.
The model produces new predictions that might be tested in
future empirical research and expand our knowledge about PIT.
In particular, if specific PIT is an effect of “augmenting chances
of success,” then instrumental actions that already have 100%
chances of success should not be able to benefit from specific PIT
(but they could still benefit from general PIT). The reinforcement
schedules used to test PIT are non-continuous, so pressing the
lever has not 100% chance of delivering food. It will be interesting
to see if under a continuous reinforcement schedule this predic-
tion will be confirmed or not. As for the principle of context, we
might expect that in an experimental procedure where the two
levers could be somewhat linked to the same context instead of
“excluding each other,” we should observe less or no PIT inhibi-
tion. Indeed in the experiment of Corbit and Janak (2010) where
rats were presented levers in an alternating fashion but within sin-
gle sessions, results indicate a strong PIT effect in the different
condition too, albeit somewhat less than the same condition (see
Figure 5). A specific procedure focusing on the role of context
might shed further light to confirm this part of the hypothesis. As
for the utility effect, our hypothesis is not enough detailed to go
beyond the fact that general PIT should be subject to devaluation,
as already shown in the literature (Corbit et al., 2007). We do not
know if the “additional reward” needs to be a different type of
food compared to the instrumental action, or if a CS that signals
the same food, but in a larger quantity, could be equally effective
in producing general PIT.
In our attempt to provide an hypothesis capable of explain-
ing all three PIT processes, we have focused on results achieved
with the paradigm capable of detecting all of them (Corbit
and Balleine, 2005; Corbit et al., 2007; Corbit and Balleine,
2011). However, those experiments involved multiple levers and a
random-ratio schedule, thus evoking goal-directed behavior. This
is why our hypothesis is proposed to be an explanation of how
PIT processes affect goal-directed behavior. However, most of
PIT experimental data has actually been produced using interval
schedules (see Holmes et al., 2010 for a review). If those schedules
have often evoked habitual responding, then a lot of data would
fall outside the main focus of our hypothesis, which is limited to
goal-directed behavior. That being said, we do have some sugges-
tions on how PIT might work during habitual behavior. We have
indeed suggested that specific PIT can only happen during goal-
directed behavior as it pertains the chances of achieving a goal.
During habitual behavior, there is no goal evaluation and thus we
suggest that a CS paired with the same reward of the lever would
produce general PIT instead. Then, some of the differences found
in literature data could be explained by the use of different rein-
forcement schedules, leading to habitual vs. goal-directed behavior
(e.g., Hall et al., 2001 vs. Blundell et al., 2001).
Beyond the contrast between Hall et al. (2001) and Blundell
et al. (2001), we have another-contradiction in the literature
which could be mostly resolved by differences of how PIT works
under goal-directed vs. habitual behavior. We have mentioned
above that Holland (2004) reported results that indicate that both
specific and general PIT are insensitive to devaluation. This is in
contrast with the results of Corbit et al. (2007) where only specific
PIT is immune to devaluation. The results from Holland (2004)
can be mostly reconciled by noting that he used an interval sched-
ule, thus probably eliciting in many cases habitual behavior. In all
those cases, the fact that general PIT was not affected by the deval-
uation procedure can be explained by the fact that under habitual
behavior the baseline performance is not subject to devaluation
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either. In other words, we might suppose that under habitual
behavior the devaluation process is “inactive” and thus it does
not affect general PIT either. This would reconcile all results from
the experiments of Holland (2004) except one: one of the exper-
imental groups displayed infact a devaluation effect on baseline
performance but not on the general PIT effect (Figure 4D in his
article). That result would still conflict with Corbit et al. (2007)’s
results, even after the additional assumption that general PIT
might not be subject to devaluation under habitual behavior. The
solution to this contradiction might lie on the devaluation proce-
dure used. While Corbit et al. (2007) used satiety to devalue food
rewards, Holland (2004) used an aversion procedure (pairings
with LiCl): it might then be that the two devaluation procedures
affect differently general PIT.
In our computational model, the analysis is limited to how
the agent can make different inferences depending on the test
conditions but it does not show how these inferences are trans-
formed into action. We need to build a more complete model that
can account on how these perceived higher efficacy or additional
rewards are transformed into an higher instrumental perfor-
mance. Moreover, the model is purely functional and does not
yet shed light on the neural mechanisms underlying PIT. Neural
models might be developed to this purpose. Future developments
of the model and the hypothesis should also address conditions
such as the use of drugs of abuse and chronic stress, which are
known to have an effect on PIT (Wyvell and Berridge, 2001;
Corbit and Janak, 2007; Morgado et al., 2012).
Despite the above mentioned limitations, we think our
hypothesis can give a new perspective on PIT, a new framework
on which to discuss, experiment, and advance our knowledge on
PIT. Of particular importance is the investigation of why there is a
PIT effect, i.e., its role in animal adaptation. We have done a first
step in this direction by proposing that PIT relates to the ability of
using signals in the environment to better evaluate the possibilites
of action.
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